The Ripple of Fear, Sympathy and Solidarity During the Boston Bombings by Lin, Yu-Ru & Margolin, Drew
Lin and Margolin EPJ Data Science 2014, 3:31
http://www.epjdatascience.com/content/3/1/31
REGULAR ART ICLE Open Access
The ripple of fear, sympathy and solidarity
during the Boston bombings
Yu-Ru Lin1* and Drew Margolin2
*Correspondence: yurulin@pitt.edu
1School of Information Sciences,
University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh,
PA 15260, USA
Full list of author information is
available at the end of the article
Abstract
The Boston Marathon bombing presents a rare opportunity to study how a disruptive
event can trigger inter-communal emotions and expressions - where members of
one community express feelings about and support for members of a distant
community. In this work, we use over 180 million geocoded tweets over an entire
month to study how Twitter users from diﬀerent cities expressed three diﬀerent
emotions: fear, sympathy and solidarity, in reaction to the bombings. We capture
spikes in fear in diﬀerent cities by using sentiment and time-series analyses, and track
expressions of sympathy and solidarity based on the emergent use of two hashtags,
#prayforboston and #bostonstrong, widely adopted after the bombings. We ﬁnd ﬁrst
that the extent to which communities outside Boston express these emotions is
correlated with their geographic proximity, social network connections, and residents’
direct, physical experiences with Boston (captured by the number of citizens who had
visited Boston recently). This general eﬀect shows interesting diﬀerences across the
diﬀerent kinds of emotions, however. Analyses show that the extent to which
residents of a city visit Boston is the best predictor of fear and solidarity expression, as
well as a strong predictor of the expression of sympathy. The expression of fear is also
directly related to the expression of solidarity. Our study has theoretical implications
regarding the diﬀusion of information and emotional contagion as well as practical
implications for understanding how important information and social support can be
eﬀectively collected and distributed to populations in need.
Keywords: emotional contagion; disaster; crisis management; social support;
natural experiment; social network analysis; social media; communication streams
1 Introduction
The goal of terrorism is to spread fear. Through the perpetration of spectacular violence,
terrorists can induce irrational decisions in frightened populations, weakening their in-
frastructure and public conﬁdence [] and, in some cases, persuading the population to
give in to terrorist demands []. Understanding how fear spreads through a population is
thus critical to eﬀorts to limit the damage and impact of terrorist acts.
The dynamics of fear are diﬃcult to characterize, however, as they involve complex
processes that operate at multiple levels. Individuals become afraid when they perceive a
threat over which they believe they have little control [, ]. These perceptions are formed
by appraising stimuli from their physical environment but also from social cues and con-
text [, ] provided through inter-personal conversations [], mass media [], and more
recently, social media []. In addition to being induced by perceptions of risk at the indi-
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vidual level, fear can be passed along through emotional contagion across social network
ties [, ]. Group processes also participate in the spread of fear. When individuals iden-
tify themselves with a social group, they are likely to feel threatened when this group is
threatened, even if they themselves are not in immediate danger [].
Further complicating matters is the fact that individuals may not experience fear in a
stable, observablemanner. Thismakes fear diﬃcult tomeasure. Fearmotivates individuals
to adjust their decisions and behavior, generally toward an avoidance of further risk [],
including preferences for government policies anddemands for government response [].
When avoidance or other coping strategies are successful, fear dissipates [, ]. When
coping strategies are unsuccessful or are insuﬃcient to reduce threat, fear can remain over
very long periods of time []. However, when individuals become aware of strategies that
can address the threat and these strategies are delayed, ignored, or obstructed, fear often
converts to anger []. This potential for fear to rise quickly, inﬂuence decision-making,
and then disappear or transform into other emotions makes it diﬃcult to measure in real-
world situations.
Thus the question of ‘who is likely to be afraid’ in the immediate aftermath of a terrorist
attack is important and yet diﬃcult to answer. Of particular interest is the spread of fear
to populations outside of the city or community directly under attack. After the terrorist
attacks of September , , researchers documented the broad diﬀusion of fear and fear
related responses, such as post-traumatic stress disorder, to cities outside of NewYork and
countries outside of theUS [–]. These ﬁndings suggest that various social connections
between communities serve as channels over which emotional responses to terrorism are
ampliﬁed [].
This paper represents a ﬁrst systematic examination of such community-community
ties. Using the attack at the Boston Marathon as a focal event, we ask which other major
US and world cities demonstrated the greatest emotional consistency with Bostonians
after the attack by analyzing tweets from these cities in terms of their expressions of fear,
sympathy, and social solidarity.We then design a prediction framework that predicts these
post-event community responses based on the pre-event Twitter communication streams.
We ﬁnd that several factors are associated with sharing fear with the community tar-
geted by a terrorist act. Cities that are geographically closer, where individuals share more
social media relationships with Boston residents, and where individuals have more imme-
diate, direct experiencewith Boston, weremore likely to share fearwith Bostonians. Direct
experience, however, shows the strongest andmost robust relationship to fear.We also ex-
amine the role that these three factors play in the expression of social support for Boston
in terms of expressions of sympathy and solidarity. While expressions of sympathy are
predicted by the same factors as fear, expressions of solidarity, evidenced by the use of the
deﬁant #bostonstrong hashtag, reveal interesting dynamics in which fear itself appears to
play an important role.
Through the analysis of community-wide expressions of fear, sympathy, and solidarity
in reaction to the Boston bombings, this study makes the following contributions:
() Identiﬁes robust community-to-community emotional relationships via social
media;
() Discerns a key antecedent to these relationships: direct, personal experience being a
dominant predictor;
Lin and Margolin EPJ Data Science 2014, 3:31 Page 3 of 28
http://www.epjdatascience.com/content/3/1/31
() Provides a quantitative understanding of the emotional impact of a terrorist act on
its target audiences.
2 Motivation and background
2.1 Background
The bombing of the BostonMarathon onApril ,  resulted in  deaths andmore than
 casualties. Over the subsequent week police engaged in an area-wide manhunt that
resulted in a ‘lockdown’ of Boston and neighboring suburbs [–]. Citizens of Boston,
whowere at one point instructed directly by theGovernor ofMassachusetts to stay in their
homes to avoid danger, were understandably afraid. Examples were seen on Twitter: ‘Just
can’t shake the horror of yesterday. A search warrant has been executed in a Revere apt
complex, even closer to home.’ ‘Holy shit ﬁrst the bombing now a shooting at MIT can’t
people just leave Boston alone.’ Bostonians were not the only ones who became afraid,
however. Those with loved ones who lived in Boston, or had traveled to Boston for the
marathon, worried for their safety, e.g., ‘Thinking of all my family and people I know in
Massachusetts/Boston area and imagining their fear is heartbreaking.’ For others, their
sense of the benevolence of the world was shaken [], e.g., ‘This world is becoming a truly
scary place. As though bombing a marathon wasnt enough.’ ‘Seriously what the hell is
going on in this city. . . #peoplesuck #gunshots #explosions #getoutofhere #bostonstrong.’
Fear was not the only response in Boston, however, or in its fellow communities. The
slogan ‘Boston Strong’ emerged as a rallying cry to demonstrate the city’s deﬁance in re-
sponse to the terrorists’ attempt to intimidate them []. Boston-area residents organized
community events such as the ‘Run to Remember’memorial foot-race andmusic concerts.
Just as the attacks spread fear well beyond Boston itself, expressions of social support were
also directed to Boston from around the globe. InNewYork, fans of theNewYork Yankees
baseball team, the bitter rival of Boston’s team (the Red Sox), stood in their stadium to sing
‘Sweet Caroline,’ the Red Sox anthem []. In Chicago, more than  runners gathered
for a run of solidarity []. A week after the Boston Marathon, thousands of marathon
runners in London wore a black ribbon in solidarity with the people of Boston [].
Interestingly, such extensions of support across community-community relations have
been observed in other circumstances when tragic or disastrous events befall a partic-
ular locale []. What do these reactions reveal about the nature of social organization
in the st century? Recent technical and social innovations have enabled individuals to
break out from their traditional geographic and cultural boundaries, creating a ‘network
society’ []. This de-coupling of the social from the geographic has given individuals in-
creased personal autonomybut has also created challenges for civic institutions concerned
with supporting their needs and anticipating their behavior [, ]. Does London have a
particular kind of social tie to Boston? If so, what is its basis? Are these ties based on inter-
personal relationships, or on the basis of shared identiﬁcation with some set of cultural
symbols, such as the rituals around baseball that appear to have motivated the responses
of Yankee fans [, ]. What motivates these inter-communal relationships? What char-
acteristics of the relationships between communities might lead one to respond when the
other is attacked or befallen by disaster, and how do these inter-communal relationships
inﬂuence the impact and eﬀectiveness of terrorist acts in promoting fear?
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2.2 Ripples of fear and related emotions
According to legal scholar Cass Sunstein [] ‘Terrorists show a working knowledge of ’
the dynamics of fear, in particular, the kinds of spectacles that prompt the general pub-
lic to become afraid. Experts typically evaluate threats, such as those posed by terrorist
attacks, in terms of expected costs and casualties derived from the probability of an at-
tack and its typical consequences []. By contrast, the public’s responses to threats are
subject to what risk researchers call social ampliﬁcation [, ]. In social ampliﬁcation,
individuals heighten their emotion and communication about some threats and attenuate
their responses to others in a manner that is inconsistent with expert calculations of their
expected outcomes. Threats are socially ampliﬁed because individuals appraise and inter-
pret them in the context of personal circumstances, social relationships, and institutional
expectations that include factors that go beyond the calculable, physical consequences
constituted by the threats themselves. Such contexts include, for example, concerns about
the quality of the information they are receiving or worries that their government is not
competently addressing the problem [].
Terrorist attacks are designed to be ampliﬁed in this way []. First, the vivid and
spectacular nature of terrorist violence draws increased attention and intense emotion
[, ]. The irrevocable and horrifying nature of the terrorist outcomes also invokes dread
[, , , ], a powerful feature in the evaluation of risk.When individuals dread an out-
come, they are more likely to take action and to demand that others take action. They
become insensitive to rational appeals and trade-oﬀs as fear motivates them to insist the
outcome be avoided at almost any cost [, ]. Second, the unexpected nature of the attack
also serves what researchers refer to as a signalling function. An event has high signalling
value when its occurrence suggests that previously unconsidered risks deserve greater at-
tention and that existing institutions and authorities are not adequately prepared to deal
with a threat [, ]. In this way, terrorism undermines the public’s conﬁdence in its own
government and institutions [, ]. Furthermore, the fearful individuals are likely to
over-estimate the likelihood of future terrorist events [, , ].
A third feature of terrorist acts is their relationship to groups and group identities. Self-
categorization refers to the cognitive processes that lead people to identify with particular
groups, such as ethnic, regional, or national communities [, ]. Social identity refers to
the evaluations individuals make of themselves and others based on their group member-
ship []. Disasters tend to impact the ways in which people self-categorize themselves.
Individuals normally participate and identify with many distinct (but somewhat overlap-
ping) communities []. When one such group is threatened, however, this identity be-
comes more salient andmany individuals will more closely identify with it []. The eﬀect
is to increase solidarity within the ‘in-group,’ with individuals becoming more charitable
and supportive of those who they recognize sharing their identity [], while simultane-
ously becoming more mistrustful of and hostile toward those they perceive to be ‘out-
siders’ []. These eﬀects are particularly important in the context of terrorist attacks.
Unlike natural disasters, terrorist attacks are socio-political acts directed by members of
one group against another. Thus, in addition to signalling that members of one’s group
are exposed to a previously unanticipated risk, terrorist attacks indicate that these risks
are due to the planned, intentional behavior of an out-group [, ]. For example, after
the attacks of /, Americans all over the country responded by prominently displaying
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American ﬂags []. At the same time, many Americans felt more hostile toward Muslim
nations and violence against Muslims increased [].
All of these non-objective, social factors lead the ampliﬁcation of fear and related emo-
tions in response to terrorist attacks to ‘ripple’ out from the geographic locale in which the
attack takes place. Risk researchers deﬁne ‘ripple’ eﬀects as the eﬀect of an event on emo-
tions, appraisals and decisions in geographically and temporally distant contexts. Ripples
can travel over many paths. Vivid images are likely to be carried and shared through me-
dia [], bringing information about the attack to a larger and geographically dispersed
audience. At the same time, the ‘signal’ that existing understandings and institutions have
not properly assessed risk and threats leads to the broader conclusion that no one is safe
anywhere [, ]. Group identiﬁcation also has a potentially large geographic reach. In
a conﬂict between groups, individuals may feel compelled to choose sides or risk being
identiﬁed as members of the out-group by both communities []. For example, after the
/ attacks almost half of Germans surveyed say they agreed with the statement ‘we are
all Americans now.’
In addition to these ripples motivated by identiﬁable processes, there is also evidence
that expressions of emotion are themselves contagious. For example, [] found that rainfall
in one location slightly depresses both residents of that geographic area and their friends
at distant locations. Kramer et al. [] ﬁnd similar results using a controlled experiment.
These ﬁndings suggest that the mere incidence of an emotion, such as fear, at a distant
location may encourage others to take on that emotion, even if they do not identify with
the group that is attacked or believe that the attack is a signal of a new threat.
These ripple eﬀects, and ripples of fear in particular, have important practical conse-
quences for ﬁrst responders and other civic authorities who must respond to terrorist
attacks. Fear can lead to costly and irrational decision-making, including the undertaking
of behaviors with greater objective risk [, ]. For example, after the attacks of /, many
individuals substituted driving for ﬂying in planes, actually increasing personal and public
risk []. The inability to address fears through concrete action can also lead to its persis-
tence over time, a condition associated with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) [, ,
]. Fear can also place demands on local infrastructure, such as the need for increased law
enforcement or the perception that local or national governments are not competent or
addressing the needs of the people [], and can even inﬂuence long term assessments of
the economy []. Fear can lead individuals to lean on unfair, irrational biases that unfairly
target others for harm []. In particular, when individuals perceive that the threatening
situation has been brought under control, fear is likely to convert to anger which then
motivates attacks against outsiders or others perceived to be a source of threat [, ].
The connection that people feel to those who were attacked can also spur positive emo-
tions and actions. There is evidence that an individual’s emotional proximity to a tragedy
is associated with their willingness to extend social support to those in need [], and that
when individuals self-categorize as amembers of the threatened community they perceive
it as something that eﬀects ‘us’ rather than a set of others who are distinct from ‘me’ [].
For example, after a shooting at Northern Illinois University in February,  students
from Virginia Tech University, where there had been a shooting only  months before,
oﬀered extensive support to their newly victimized ‘neighbors’ []. It is thus possible that
fear and support are linked. Those who feel a close connection with the distant, eﬀected
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community will likely feel the threat more acutely and personally, making them bothmore
afraid and yet more willing to help.
The preceding argument suggests there is substantial theoretical and practical value in
understanding where ripples of fear and related emotions are likely to ﬂow. When a com-
munity in one geographic location is directly attacked,where elsedo people become afraid?
Such information would be useful to civic authorities seeking to anticipate how their local
communities might be eﬀected by distant events. It would also shed theoretical light on
the social processes most prominent in the diﬀusion of fear and other responses as well as
new insights into how they operate.
To date, however, little research has focused on these emotion spreading processes in
response to real-world terrorist attacks or disaster events more broadly. Most studies of
emotional responses to terrorist attacks focus on those in the area directly eﬀected.When
individuals from other communities are included in the analysis they are used for the pur-
poses of comparison and control [, , ] or are treated as a single group characterized
as a whole [, , ]. Conversely, studies of emotional contagion and other forms of diﬀu-
sion tend to focus on theway that individualized emotions and information about personal
events are communicated over social network ties [, , ]. Thus, these studies provide
little insight into how fear or other feelings diﬀuse when relevant information and emo-
tion is simultaneously broadcast both over social ties and through other channels, such as
mass media [, ].
Perhaps one of the reasons for limited study in this area is the diﬃculty of observing geo-
graphically dispersed behavior in the immediate aftermath of a terrorist attack. However,
social media data oﬀer the potential to overcome this limitation.
2.3 Social media and collective responses to disasters
Social media data have been gaining increasing attention in studies of emergencies and
disasters, a ﬁeld often referred to as crisis informatics []. Social media data are useful
because they contain ﬁne-grained information regarding the timing and location of indi-
vidual responses. This permits researchers to analyze real-world behaviors in close prox-
imity to dangerous and disastrous events without them having to anticipate where and
when they will occur.
Individuals often rely on social media in emergency circumstances to support a variety
of information needs that are not fully served by authorities or established news outlets.
Social media facilitate ‘backchannel communication’ [] by allowing users to obtain timely
and accurate information tailored to their local context [, –]. In addition to provid-
ing information about the threatening event itself, social media can also help coordinate
eﬀorts to provide assistance [, ].
Consistent with ﬁndings from studies of more general behavior, research indicates that
individuals who are in areas directly under threat use social media diﬀerently than those
who are more distant. In particular, directly aﬀected individuals are signiﬁcantly more
likely to share speciﬁc, locally relevant information, whereas more distant individuals are
more likely to share generic information, such as an image from the disaster []. This
intensity of information sharing on social media, particularly among locals, has become
useful for detecting events or circumstances before they reachmainstreammedia. Twitter
has been utilized as an early detection system for emerging public health problems [–
], real-time emergency detection [–] and crisis management [, , ].
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The focus of these analyses has largely been on gathering information about the physical
realities that correspond to the threat, however, rather than the perceptions and emotions
that result from it. Thus, researchers have placed emphasis on the spread of rumor and
misinformation with the aim of identifying and removing inaccuracies [, –]. Less
attention has been paid to the diﬀusion of emotions and social realities, such as group
identiﬁcation, that also follow from the social ampliﬁcation of threats. One exception is
[], who map the expression of positive and negative emotion in response to Hurricane
Sandy. Their ﬁndings focus on the unique features of those directly eﬀected by the storm,
who are more likely to tweet negative sentiments, rather than on a comparison between
the unaﬀected areas.
Such comparisons are the focus of our work, which advances a systematic understand-
ing of the inter-communal relationships that facilitate ripples of emotion by comparing
tweets issued from diﬀerent cities in response to the BostonMarathon bombings to other
observable relationships between these cities and Boston. We employ a concept-based af-
fective lexicon SentiSense [] to extract diﬀerent categories of sentiments (e.g., anger,
fear, joy, etc.) from the tweets. We then compare these sentiments to three pre-existing
ties between each city and Boston: geographic distance, person-to-person relationships,
and personal visits between cities. Although other approaches such as LIWC Dictionary
or more recent sentiment detection techniques [, ] are also applicable, SentiSense
allows us to eﬃciently detect multiple emotional categories grounded in psychological
theories with broad vocabulary coverage. Using this approach, the scope of our analysis
is limited to content written in English. Nevertheless, through the temporal analysis of
changes in the sentiment experession captured by a broad set of lexicons, our goal is to
develop a systematic understanding regarding how users’ expression of fear varied in re-
sponse to the Marathon bombings. By analyzing the responses of communities outside of
Boston to an attack on Boston we ask:
• Which communities, outside of Boston, shared fear with Boston in the wake of the
bombings?
• What factors - geographic, social, or experiential - best explain these diﬀerent levels of
community fear?
• Are these same factors associated with expressions of social support?
• How is fear itself associated with expressions of social support?
We discuss our method and results in the following sections.
3 Method
In this section, we ﬁrst describe the data collection and the dataset used in this study.
We then present how the variables of interest, including shared fear and social support,
were captured in our study. Finally, we describe the key factors for explaining the diﬀer-
ences in communities’ shared fear and social support and the prediction models that were
used to examine the inﬂuence of these factors.
3.1 Data description
This study used nearly all geotagged tweets collected from the Twitter Streaming API [].
Figure  shows the total number of geocoded tweets (volume) per day over the month of
April in the dataset. Tweets without geocodes (latitude and longitude) are removed. The
vertical dashed lines indicate the day of Boston bombings (April ; black line) and the day
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Figure 1 Daily number of geocoded tweets (volume) in dataset. Tweets without geocodes are removed.
From top to bottom: the total daily volume, the daily volume within the Boston area, and the daily volume
within the direct aﬀected region (DAR). The vertical dashed lines indicate the day of Boston bombings (April
15; black line) and the day of manhunt (April 19; gray line). The tweets posted on April 1, 10 and one half of
the day on April 11 were missing due to data collection process errors. There are over 180 million geocoded
tweets over an entire month and only tweets posted within the geographical borders of the cities (over 38
million tweets in total) are used in further analysis.
Table 1 List of cities in our study
US cities: Albuquerque, Anaheim, Arlington, Atlanta, Aurora, Austin, Bakersﬁeld, Baltimore, Boston, Charlotte,
Chicago, Cleveland, Colorado Springs, Columbus, Corpus Christi, Dallas, Denver, Detroit, El Paso, Fort Worth,
Fresno, Honolulu, Houston, Indianapolis, Jacksonville, Kansas City, Las Vegas, Long Beach, Los Angeles, Louisville,
Memphis, Mesa, Miami, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, Nashville, New Orleans, New York, Oakland, Oklahoma City,
Omaha, Philadelphia, Phoenix, Portland, Raleigh, Riverside, Sacramento, San Antonio, San Diego, San Francisco,
San Jose, Santa Ana Seattle, St. Louis, Tampa, Tucson, Tulsa, Virginia Beach, Washington, Wichita.
Non-US cities: Bangkok, Beijing, Berlin, Bogota, Buenos Aires, Cairo, Delhi, Dhaka, Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, Hong
Kong, Istanbul, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Lagos, Lima, London, Madrid, Manila, Melbourne, Mexico City, Milan,
Montreal, Moscow, Mumbai, Paris, Rio de Janeiro, Santiago, Sao Paulo, Seoul, Shanghai, Singapore, Taipei City,
Tokyo, Toronto.
of manhunt (April ; gray line). Due to data collection process errors, tweets posted on
April ,  and half of the day on April  were missing. In the following analysis, volumes
in the three missing days are excluded when reporting aggregated statistics. The total vol-
ume before, during and after the bombing day are .M tweets/day on average, .M
tweets/day, and .M tweets/day on average.Within the Boston area, the volume before,
during and after the bombing day are , tweets/day on average, , tweets/day,
and , tweets/day on average.
Following news reports [], we manually identiﬁed the location that covers the area of
the two blasts. We categorize tweets from this area as coming from those directly aﬀected
by the attacks, and refer to this approximately . km area as the ‘directly aﬀected re-
gion’ or ‘DAR.’ Within DAR, the volume before, during and after the bombing day are 
tweets/day on average,  tweets/day, and  tweets/day on average.
Cities. In this study, we selected the largest  cities in US bymetro population based on
the US  census. We extended the selection by including the largest cities of the world
(also in terms of metro population), yielding an additional  (non-US) cities. The list of
cities is provided in Table .
The criteria for selecting the list of cities was based on the fact that more than half of the
world’s population lives in urban areas (towns and cities) [], and .% of the US popu-
lation lived in urban areas as of the  Census []. We selected cities (or metropolitan
areas) with populations of  million or more. This selection of world’s largest cities cov-
ers more than % of the world’s urban population (approximately . millions out of
. billions) []. The selection for US cities was similar. We selected cities within the
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US with population over ,, which covers more than % of US urban population
(approximately . millions out of . millions) []. We merged the two lists (several
most populated US cities are cross-listed in the set of word’s largest cities). We further
removed cities for which we did not have Twitter data for the period studied; for example,
several populated cities in China such as Guangzhou and Shenzhen were not included in
our sample due to the lack of Twitter data resulting from the country’s policy of Internet
censorship. In total, the selection criteria resulted in  US cities and  non-US cities.
We used YahooGeoAPIa to query the cities’ bounding box information as their approxi-
mate geographical borders. In our study, we used all tweets postedwithin the geographical
borders of the cities which yielded .M tweets in total. Within cities, the total volume
before, during and after the bombing day are ,, tweets/day on average, ,,
tweets/day, and ,, tweets/day on average.
3.2 Detecting fear
To study users’ expression of fear, we applied sentiment analysis to extract diﬀerent senti-
ments from the text in users’ tweet messages. We used a concept-based aﬀective lexicon
SentiSense [] to extract two diﬀerent kinds of sentiments, fear and joy. As discussed
earlier, compared with other approaches [, ], SentiSense has a broader vocabulary
coverage that allows us to eﬃciently detect multiple emotional categories grounded in
psychological theories []. Although we were mainly interested in capturing changes in
fear expression from the tweet text, it is important to understand whether the changes re-
ﬂect meaningful changes in sentiments, or just reﬂect changes in the tweet volumes. For
this reason, a diﬀerent sentiment, joy, was extracted to compare changes of the fear expres-
sion at the same time. Examples of fear related keywords include ‘fearful’, ‘unkind’, ‘crazi-
ness’, ‘crime’, ‘shudder’, ‘suﬀocate’, ‘dreadfully’, ‘terror’, ‘fatal’, ‘crash’, ‘anxiously’, ‘erupt’, etc.
and joy related keywords include ‘satisﬁed’, ‘cheerful’, ‘comfortableness’, ‘cruise’, ‘pleased’,
‘happiness’, ‘joyful’, ‘belonging’, ‘exult’, ‘rejoicing’, ‘eagerly’, ‘fortunate’, etc.
We computed the relative strength of a sentiment within a region as follows. Let L be the
list of all words in the sentiment lexicon (L contains all words related to the  diﬀerent
sentiments deﬁned in the SentiSense lexicon), and Lfear and Ljoy be the lists of fear- and
joy-related words, respectively. The degree of a sentiment type of interest c ∈ {fear, joy} in
a tweet i, denoted as si,c, is given by
si,c =
⎧
⎨
⎩
|Wi ∩ Lc|/|Wi ∩ L| if |Wi ∩ L| > ,
 if |Wi ∩ L| = ,
whereWi is the words in the text content of tweet i. The sentiment index SRT ,c of a region
R (deﬁned by a bounding box) within a particular time interval T is given by
SRT ,c =

m
∑
ti∈T ,gi∈R
si,c
∑
c′ si,c′ + 
,
where ti and gi are the timestamp and geocode of tweet i, respectively, and m = |i : ti ∈
T , gi ∈ R|. si,c ∈ [, ] is the degree of fear or joy in a tweet, and tweets with si,c =  were
still included in this computation. If a tweet does not contain fear or joy sentiment, this
will lead to a division-by-zero issue. Therefore we adjusted the denominator by adding a
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Figure 2 Sentiment indices over time in (a) the direct affected region (DAR) and (b) the City of Boston.
The hourly sentiment indices of fear (and joy) before, during and after the Boston bombings are shown in
smooth ﬁtted curves over time (in UTC) with shaded area indicating a 95% conﬁdence region. The vertical
dashed lines around April 15 and 19 indicate the times of bombings and manhunt, respectively. The spikes in
the level of fear correspond to the Boston bombings and the subsequent events, while the level of joy does
not exhibit a sudden increase and is relatively stable over the period.
Figure 3 Sentiment indices over time in (a) Boston, compared with those in (b) New York City,
(c) Washington and (d) Chicago. Similar but slightly weaker spike patterns were observed in New York City,
Washington and Chicago over the same time (in UTC).
small value  = .. So SRT ,c will be lower whenmore tweets contained neither fear nor joy
sentiments.
Based on the above calculation, the fear index (or joy index) is a normalized measure of
the relative strength of fear (or joy) regardless of number of tweets posted within a region
and a time interval.
Figure  shows the hourly fear (and joy) indices within DAR and the City of Boston,
from April  to . Compared with joy indices, the fear indices exhibit greater sudden
increases around April  and April , corresponding to the times of the blasts and the
subsequent manhunt. The substantial diﬀerence between the two indices suggests both
that fear was triggered in response to the event and that the lexicon captures the diﬀerent
sentimental expressions.
In Figure  we show the sentiment indices in Boston and three other cities: New York
City, Washington and Chicago, over the same time period. We observe similar, though
slightlyweaker, spike patterns in all three cities, where the ﬁrst peaks onApril  have a six-
to eight-hour delay comparedwith the ﬁrst peak in Boston. The highest fear level in Boston
is at least . times the fear level in the other cities. This indicates that, unsurprisingly,
the community on which the attacks had a direct impact had stronger and quicker fear
responses. Nonetheless, Twitter sentiment captures similar responses in these othermajor
US cities as well.
To test there were signiﬁcant changes in Twitter users’ fearful response after the bomb-
ing event, we conduct a paired t-test to assess the signiﬁcance of changes in Twitter users’
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fearful response before and after the event. The fear correlations with Boston are mea-
sured within a week before the event and within a week after the event. The test result
suggests that there was a signiﬁcant increase in fear correlation after the event (the sam-
ple mean diﬀerence is . with p-value = .).
We also observe a small increase in joy in DAR on April , which corresponds to the
day when the suspect, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, was charged []. The increase in joy is less
apparent within the City of Boston more broadly and other major cities. This may suggest
that the local community from the directly aﬀected region (DAR) retained higher attention
on the bombing related events.
To understand the extent to which a city shares the fear expressed by Boston in response
to the event we compute the fear correlation between Boston and the given city in terms
of the correlation between the two cities’ timeseries of fear indices. Concretely, the corre-
lation is computed by using Spearman’s rank correlation coeﬃcient, which measures the
strength of two cities’ fear indicies increasing or decreasing consistently regardless of the
amount. Due to the non-normality of the distribution of cities’ fear correlations, we use
Box-Cox transformation [] to determine the use of square root function to transform
the variable to normality. In the following analyses, the fear correlations being examined
are square-root-transformed.
In Figure (a) we plot the cities’ transformed fear correlation with Boston against their
geographical distance from Boston. The ﬁgure shows that the correlation between a city
and Boston declines with distance. Washington, New York, and Philadelphia, each of
which are within one day’s drive or less of Boston, are numbers , , and  most highly
correlated with Boston, respectively. Montreal and Toronto, similarly located in driving
distance from Boston, are two of the three most highly correlated international cities.
3.3 Expressions of social support
In Twitter, hashtags are ubiquitous and ﬂexible annotations allowing users to track ongo-
ing conversations, signal membership in a community, or communicate non-verbal ideas
like joy and sadness. Hashtags often reﬂect eccentric topics and their emergence is hap-
penstance. Novel events often lead to the creation of new hashtags, making their early
dynamics observable []. Over the two weeks after the Boston Marathon bombings and
subsequent events we observe new hashtags such as #bostonmarathon, #prayforboston,
and #bostonstrong that were created and quickly adopted by many users in their tweets.
These hashtags serve diﬀerent conversational purposes. For example, #bostonmarathon
is a topical hashtag, most popular on April  that was used mainly in the Boston area
to indicate any Boston-Marathon-related conversations. We focus on the emergent use of
hashtags #prayforboston and #bostonstrong. Each hashtag was widely adopted after the
bombings and, as described below, substantially used to express emotional content.
.. Meaning of the hashtags
The origins of these hashtags suggest they are used to express diﬀerent forms of social sup-
port for Bostonians. The #prayforboston hashtag is a variant on the ‘#prayfor{X}’ hashtags
that have been used in recent years in response to various disasters []. In response to the
riots in London in , [] ﬁnd that users largely tweeted messages of general concern
and sympathy to the diﬀerent #prayfor hashtags associated with that event (#prayforlon-
don, #prayforuk). Tweets to #prayforboston would thus express feelings associated with
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Figure 4 The expression of fear, sympathy and solidarity in relation to geo-distance, social ties and
personal visits. (a-c) are scatterplots of the fear correlation (with square root transformation for normality)
with Boston against geographic proximity (inverse distance in kilometers), number of replies, and number of
personal visit, respectively. (d-f) are scatterplots of #prayforboston volume (total number of tweets containing
the hashtag) against the three factors. (g-i) are scatterplots of #bostonstrong against the three factors. In all
plots, non-US and US cities are colored in red and blue, respectively. The correlation coeﬃcients are reported
on top of the scatterplots, where (a-c) are Pearson correlation coeﬃcients between the variables x and log(y),
and (d-i) are Spearman’s rank correlation coeﬃcients between the variables x and y. All coeﬃcients are
signiﬁcant with p-value < 0.001. Among the 35 non-US cities, #prayforboston appeared in 25 cities, while
#bostonstrong only appeared in 3 cities (Toronto, Montreal, and Melbourne). Cities with zero #prayforboston
or #bostonstrong hashtags are not shown.
empathic concern, deﬁned as ‘an other other-oriented emotional response elicited by and
congruent with the perceived welfare of someone else’ [] (pp.-). In these tweets
individualsmay attempt to comfort other people or express concern for theirwelfare based
on the knowledge that these others are in danger or distress.
The #bostonstrong hashtag is also a variation on an existing phrase used to express feel-
ings toward people under threat or duress. The aim of the expression is not to express con-
cern or to comfort, however. The hashtag is a variation on the phrase ‘{X}strong’ ﬁrstmade
popular by Lance Armstrong’s ‘Livestrong’ campaign and later adapted by the US Army
for its slogan ‘Army Strong’ []. The sentiment expressed in these phrases is more prop-
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erly described as solidarity. Solidarity is an expression of identiﬁcation with and pledge to
support a community with the aim of ensuring its survival, prosperity or victory in com-
petition with other groups [, ]. Solidarity is often expressed through ritual displays
of shared symbols such as ﬂags [], and focuses on the community and its relationship
to external threats. In contrast to expressions of sympathy, expressions of solidarity do
not focus on the vulnerability of the group or group members but rather emphasize the
group’s strength and ability to control its fate []. Of particular importance, expressions
of solidarity may force individuals to ‘choose sides’ between groups in a way that is not
incumbent on those who simply express sympathy.
With thousands of tweets from thousands of diﬀerent individuals to each hashtag the
meanings of the terms are unlikely to be completely homogeneous or stable over time.
Nonetheless, their distinct semantic origins suggest that they each carry diﬀerent kinds
of social support messages. For the sake of simplicity we will refer to the #prayforboston
messages as ‘sympathy’ messages and the #bostonstrongmessages as ‘solidarity’ messages.
Despite their diﬀerent original meanings, it is possible that in the context of the bomb-
ings these hashtags largely merged in their usage. To ensure that these hashtags were used
to express distinct feelings we conduct a content analysis to qualitatively characterize the
tweets posted to them. Since our goal is to see consider whether the hashtags merged into
new meanings distinct from their origins, we ﬁrst used a inductive approach to create
themes for a random sample of  tweets posted outside of Boston city with either of
the hashtags. In the sample set,  of the tweets contain the hashtag #bostonstrong (but
not #prayforboston) and the remaining  contain the #prayforboston (but not #boston-
strong). To create a coding system, a team (one of the authors and a coder S) conducted an
open coding of the data, allowing codes to emerge, rather than searching for codes based
on existing categories. The team iteratively coded the sampled tweets and discussed the
codes, coming to agreement on seven themes as listed in Table  (with codes A to A).
Each theme appeared at least once in the sample. Two of the other coders, S and S, who
were not involved in the open coding process, then independently applied these codes to
the sampled tweets. These coding results are shown in Figure . The inter-coder reliability
for the three coders (team, S, S) was % for #bostonstrong tweets, and consistent with
expectations, most (%) of the sampled tweets with #bostonstrong were given the codes
A (celebration), A (identify with community) or A (regarding community events and
rituals), that are associated with solidarity. These codes did not apply well to #prayfor-
boston, however. The inter-coder reliability for these tweets was low, (%) and they were
largely distributed away from these themes and toward the more personally sensitive, in
particular, A (comfort).
Since our goal was to understand whether the hashtags were the same or diﬀerent, we
divide the coding categories into two groups - solidarity (A-A) and other (A-A). Here
the inter-coder agreement improves to % for the tweets with #bostonstrong, and %
for the #prayforboston tweets. In addition, while % of #bostonstrong tweets remain in
the solidarity category, only .% of the #prayforboston tweets ﬁt these solidarity themes.
A Pearson’s Chi-squared test with Monte Carlo simulation shows that this diﬀerence is
statistically signiﬁcant (χ = ., p < .). This analysis thus conﬁrms that the two
hashtags, when used independently, were used to convey diﬀerent meanings. See Table 
for more examples of tweets containing the two hashtags.
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Table 2 Codes used in the analysis
Code Description Example(s)
A1 Positive comments or
anticipation about the progress
of the bombing case, including
appreciation for progress or for
resolving this case/reporting
the progress/celebration
‘Suspect is alive and in custody! #bostonstrong’
‘To the @Boston_Police ,FBI and State Police, a job well
done. Slainte cheers, what a great start to the weekend.
#bostonstrong #thankyou’
‘Toasting a drink to Boston’s ﬁnest and the best city in
the US with my favorite masshole @SaucyMeats
#BostonStrong’
A2 Comments related to the
identity of a city of the country,
including love and pride for
Boston or from other
cities/Solidarity as ‘American’,
‘Bostonian’, or ‘New England’
‘Watching the Red Sox game even though I hate them.
Gotta show respect to the people of Boston.
#BostonStrong’
‘@BarackObama : We refuse to be terrorized. #manhunt
#bostonstrong #nation @whitehouse’
‘I’ve never been more proud to be from New England.
#BostonStrong’
A3 Community events and rituals,
including sport games (Red
Sox, Celtics, players, etc.),
parades, etc.
‘It’s like a superbowl parade on the streets of Watertown
with residents thanking #ﬁrstresponders. #heroes
#bostonproud #BostonStrong #fb’
‘Great pre-game ceremony at Fenway Park
#BostonStandsAsOne #BostonStrong and one time only
#letsgosoxs’
A4 Expressing concern, emotion
(empathy, sorrow, anger,
confusion, terriﬁed feelings,
etc), comfort, or wishes for
good outcomes regarding
bombing or people
loved/aﬀected
‘Can’t sleep. What an awful day for Boston and America..
#prayforboston’
‘Damn! Now 3 people announced dead. I’m legit getting
really angry now #prayforboston’
‘The thought of people I love being in that kind of
danger alone makes me so sick. I LOVE you all
#prayforboston’
‘Keeping Boston in my prayers #prayforboston’
A5 Comments with a viewpoint,
expressing a perspective that
can be used to consider or
experience the bombing
events or calling for actions
using a particular perspective
‘Sometimes you just have to be thankful that you at least
made it to today. Someone else might not have been as
fortunate #prayforboston’
‘Was gonna tweet about how much I hate waking up for
class but the fact that I get to wake up each day is a
privilege #PrayForBoston’
‘It’s truly eye-opening when the unimaginable hits so
close to home. To think some live w/ such fear everyday
#prayforboston #prayforhumanity’
A6 Questioning ‘prayforboston’ ‘For those who say thoughts and prayers for Boston,
actually say a prayer and not just make a status for the
attention #prayforboston’
A7 Cynical or condemning
comments
‘You go to watch a movie, you get shot. You go to
school, you get shot. You run a marathon, you get
bombed #WelcomeToAmerica #PrayForBoston’
.. How did these two hashtags relate to fear and other variables?
The distinct nature of these hashtags makes it likely that there are geographic diﬀer-
ences in their use. In particular, while the generic nature of sympathy (as expressed by
#prayforboston) might not have any geographic speciﬁcity, expressions of solidarity (us-
ing #bostonstrong) would be expected from cities with deeper ties to Boston that include
shared regional or cultural identities.
As described above, the ﬁrst hashtag #prayforboston became popular immediately af-
ter the bombings. The second hashtag #bostonstrong was populated two days after and
gained its highest popularity around April  due to the ‘Boston Strong’ community
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Figure 5 Frequency of categories associated with the two hashtags.Most (83%) of the sampled tweets
with #bostonstrong were given the code A1, A2 and A3. The majority of the sampled tweets with
#prayforboston were given the code A4, and some were coded as A5, A6 and A7. In rare cases, a tweet cannot
be assigned to one of the seven codes, which include: (Mu)Multiple codes: the coders agreed that more than
one code can apply to the tweet; (No) No agreement: the coders did not reach an agreement for the code(s) of
the tweet; (Un) Uncodable: the coders did not understand the content of the tweet.
Table 3 Example tweets during Boston bombings
Fear #prayforboston #bostonstrong
[Boston] Emergency situation!!!
Everybody gets out the station!!!!
#boston #mbta #suck (@ MBTA
Park Street Station - @mbtagm)
http://t.co/hMTm908kMc
[Boston] Theyre blowing shit up in
Boston now? Keep that shit outta
here
[NY] What a scary scene in
Boston...... Bet it was a terrorist
attack
[Washington] What the hell just
happened in Boston
[Denver] Bombing in Boston?!
Damn, the world is just all fucked
up now.
[Montreal] @MTLDaniel in Boston
no and in the united states at this
point HELL NOOOO
[Boston] #PrayForBoston how
could you sick fucks bomb my
hometown
[NY] so glad the few people i
know in boston are okay.
#prayforboston #staysafe
#devastating
[Washington] Sure glad I’m not in
#Boston like I was supposed to be
this weekend. Love you
@SarahM152 #prayforboston
#bostonmanhunt
[Denver] The acts of violence
done by the people that attack
others are unforgivable. We need
to spread love around the world.
#prayforboston
[Montreal] Thank God my family
up in Boston is alright!!
#prayforboston rest in peace to
these 2 souls that left us today.
[Boston] @GreshandZo time to
show the world why Boston truly
is a great city. You know we will
respond the way a city should.
#BostonStrong
[NY] Rivalry over? @Yankees:
#Yankees fans show their support
for Boston. #BostonStrong
[Washington] ‘@ValaAfshar: WE
WILL RUN AGAIN. #bostonstrong’ -
Absolutely. And with more pride
than ever!
[Denver] Such an emotional week
for this country. Never been more
proud to be an American.
#BOSTONSTRONG #WestTX
[Montreal] @blaisp
@Anthony_Milano merci!
Beautiful day to run a fun race in
Montreal! #bostonstrong
#runforboston
events. Similar to the detected fear, the use of the two hashtags exhibit a correlation with
the geographic proximity of cities, as shown in Figure (d,g). And similar to the expression
of fear, and despite their focus on Boston, the two hashtags also appeared widely in tweets
from other cities. Outside Boston, the level of interest among Twitter users in expressing
sympathy (in terms of #prayforboston volume) and solidarity (in terms of #bostonstrong
volume) varies. As expected from their meaning, the #prayforboston had a wider reach
than #bostonstrong. In particular, among the  non-US cities considered in this analy-
sis, #prayforboston appeared in  cities, while #bostonstrong only appeared in  cities
(Toronto, Montreal, and Melbourne). In Figure (d-i), cities with zero #prayforboston or
#bostonstrong hashtags are not shown.
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3.4 Examining factors through prediction
To better understand the antecedents and mechanisms that give rise to these ripples of
feeling we examine city level diﬀerences in the use of fear language, #prayforboston, and
#bostonstrong on three community-community dimensions that pre-date the attacks: ge-
ographical distance fromBoston, social connections to Boston, and residents’ direct, phys-
ical experiences with Boston. These dimensions are captured from our data as follows.
(a) Geographic distance (or geo) is the distance between Boston and a given city,
measured in kilometers. In the analyses, the inverse of distance - geo-proximity - is
used to facilitate comparison.
(b) Social tie (or social) is the strength of social connections maintained over social
media between Boston and a given city. We quantify the social tie strength between
two cities A and B based on the number of replies sent within approximately the
two weeks that precede the event (from April  to ), with a condition that the
reply sender and receiver were observed in cities A and B or B and A on the same
day of the reply. A user can be observed in a city if s/he posts a tweet with geocode
within the region of the city.
(c) Personal visit (or visit) is the amount of travel users made between cities. We use
personal visits between Boston and a given city to quantify the direct experience or
actual familiarity of being in Boston. We ﬁrst extract a transition ﬂow for each
individual user within the two-week pre-event period (from April  to ). The
transition ﬂow is a temporal ordered list of cities where the given user was observed
through geocoded tweets. The amount of travel between two cities A and B is then
measured based on the number of transitions between A and B or B and A by
aggregating all individual transition ﬂows.
We selected this quantity to capture cities’ relative diﬀerences in the number of
active Twitter users who traveled between the cities (before the event). The beneﬁt
of using this technique is that it directly measures the geographic ﬂow of the activity
we are interested in - tweeting. Indirect measures of personal ﬂow between cities,
such as provided by commuting ﬂows or airline traﬃc, are largely based on
non-Twitter users, and thus introduce an additional layer of interpretation. These
indirect measures also fail to capture all relevant geographic and temporal patterns.
For example, airline data does not capture traﬃc between cities via other means,
such as automobile, and publicly available airline traﬃc data captures individuals’
start and endpoints, but does not include layovers. Our measure captures
up-to-date personal visits between cities via any mode of transportation and
including any form of exposure, including time spent traveling through Boston on
the way between two other locations.
Despite these advantages, this two-week short-term time window has a limitation
due to the small portion of geocoded tweets compared to the total tweets, giving it
the potential to be noisy. It was possible that some cities would score higher than
others due to random variation, or that many cities would have no visits at all.
However, only  cities, and only  US cities, had no visits, with  cities having at
least  visits and as many as , (New York). We thus concluded that statistically
signiﬁcant correlations observed between this measure and our other indices would
be sound indicators of real relationships.
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In general, aggregate measures of a city can largely depend on the city size. In our study,
since all aggregate variables are measured from Twitter, the important measure of popu-
lation is the number of Twitter users in the cities and the level of the users’ activity rather
than the actual city size. For example, we would expect that the number of fearful tweets
would be much greater in a city in which there are a large number of heavily active users
than in a city with few users, even if the city with few users had a larger total popula-
tion. Furthermore, research on tweet behavior during disasters suggests that tweet activ-
ity spikes in response to emergency situations, with those who perceive themselves to be
more directly aﬀected showing greater activity []. Since it is the aim of this study to de-
termine where those who are more directly eﬀected are geographically, the analysis must
account for these spikes occurring in any or all of our cities. Thus, while including raw
tweet activity has the potential to introduce noise to our analysis, undermining the pos-
sibility of obtaining statistically signiﬁcant results, ignoring such spikes would potentially
introduce substantial bias. Hence, we consider the following control variable that reﬂects
both the city size and its activity in the Twitter space:
(d) Tweet activity (or Tweets) is the pre-event expected Twitter activity of a city
regardless of the event. This quantity serves as a baseline variable when explaining
the level of response to the bombing events. We quantify this baseline tweet activity
by the number of tweets posted from a city within the two-week pre-event period.
Importantly, tweet activity can ﬂuctuate substantially within short time periods due
to retweet spikes and other short-lived trends, thus potentially introducing noise to
this measure.
In Figure  we plot the fear correlation (with square root transformation), the volume of
#prayforboston and #bostonstrong against the geo-proximity, social tie and personal visit
between Boston and other cities. The fear correlation is computed based on fear indices
between April  and . The volumes of hashtags are calculated as total number of tweets
containing the hashtags posted between April  and . The ﬁrst-order correlations are
shown on top of each scatterplot. We compute Pearson correlation coeﬃcients for cor-
relations between the transformed fear correlation and the three variables, and compute
Spearman’s rank correlation coeﬃcients for correlations involving the hashtag counts (the
volumes of #prayforboston and #bostonstrong) due to their skewed distributions.
All three factors are signiﬁcantly associated with shared fear. Among the three factors,
personal visit has the highest association with shared fear, with a correlation substantially
greater than the other two. All three factors also have a signiﬁcant correlation with the
use of the social support hashtags, however, the diﬀerences are not as stark. For #boston-
strong, personal visit also has the highest value, but it is only modestly greater than social
ties, and for #prayforboston, geography has the highest correlation but it is only slightly
higher than personal visits.
These ﬁrst order correlations suggest that there is a robust city-to-city relationship in
the expression of fear and the diﬀerent forms of social support. A substantial portion of
the variance with which individuals in one city tweet similarly to individuals in another
can be explained in spatial terms, social terms, or a distinct combination of the two (visits).
These factors are themselves likely to be highly correlated, however, making it diﬃcult to
see if they operate independently. In particular, both social ties and personal visits may be
consequences of geography or one another.
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Table 4 Summary of models and included variables
Variables Models
Baseline Geo Social Visit Geo-social Geo-visit Social-visit Full
Tweets x x x x x x x x
Geo x x x x
Social x x x x
Visit x x x x
Table 5 Regression on fear
Full Best
Tweets –0.050 (0.020)∗ –0.051 (0.019)∗∗
Geo 0.014 (0.021) 0.015 (0.021)
Social –0.008 (0.028)
Visit 0.132 (0.030)∗∗∗ 0.127 (0.023)∗∗∗
Adj. R2 0.340 0.347
Os. R2 0.317 0.325
The standardized coefﬁcients, standard errors (in parentheses), adjusted R2 and out-of-sample R2 for the full model and the
best (geo-visit) model.
Weusemultivariate regression analyses to diﬀerentiate these potential explanations.We
use linear regression for the level of shared fear and Poisson regression for the count of
sympathy (#prayforboston) and the count of solidarity (#bostonstrong). To ﬁnd the most
important variables, we create the following models with diﬀerent combination of predic-
tors:
• baseline model: has a single predictor, tweet activity;
• geo model: has two predictors, tweet activity and geo-proximity;
• social model: has two predictors, tweet activity and social tie;
• visit model: has two predictors, tweet activity and personal visit;
• geo-social model: has three predictors, tweet activity, geo-proximity and social tie;
• geo-visit model: has three predictors, tweet activity, geo-proximity and personal visit;
• social-visit model: has three predictors, tweet activity, social tie and personal visit;
• full model: has four predictors, tweet activity, geo-proximity, social tie and personal
visit.
Table  summarizes the list of models and their included variables. We compare the
performance of these models in order to determine the most important variables in pre-
dictive models by taking the relationship among variables into consideration. We report
the results of this analysis in the following sections.
4 Results
4.1 Explaining shared fear
We compare how diﬀerent factors can explain the variance of shared fear in diﬀerent cities
by using linear models. All predictors are log-transformed and standardized. Table  re-
ports the regression results for the full model (containing all four predictors) and the best
model - the geo-visit - model selected as the model with the best out-of-sample R. In
both models for explaining fear, the predictor ‘visit’ has a strong and signiﬁcant eﬀect,
but the other two variables (‘geo’ and ‘social’) are not signiﬁcant when personal visits are
controlled for, though geography does make a modest contribution to the best model.
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Figure 6 Out-of-sample R2 for models of predicting shared fear.Models including the ‘visit’ predictor
perform signiﬁcantly better than others. Error bars show the bootstrapped 95% conﬁdence intervals of the
out-of-sample R2.
To further assess the quality of model, we compute out-of-sample R through -fold
cross-validation and compute the conﬁdence interval for each out-of-sample R by using
bootstrap resampling based on , replications and compute the bootstrap percentile
conﬁdence interval at % level of conﬁdence. This model assessment is deployed to be
robust to the potential inﬂuence of outlier cities. The results, shown in Figure , indi-
cate that models including the ‘visit’ predictor perform signiﬁcantly better than models
without ‘visit,’ conﬁrming the central importance of direct experience with a city in ex-
plaining expressions of fear when that city is attacked. These results do not suggest that
social factors or geographic factors are not important but rather point more speciﬁcally to
the mechanism through which they are important. Geographic proximity appears to play
a role because it encourages personal visits. Social ties may also encourage visits. Alter-
natively, direct experiences may lead to diﬀusion over other channels, such as interest in
reports from mass media or face-to-face conversations.
4.2 Explaining social support
Fear is associated with a lack of control in the face of threat while expressions of social
support, particularly for distant others, can emerge from a variety of sources [, ]. This
raises the question as to whether expressions of social support are better explained by the
other factors, particularly the social factor. Below we compare how diﬀerent factors can
explain the variance of social support in diﬀerent cities.
Because the volumes of the #prayforboston and #bostonstrong hashtags are over-
dispersed count variables we use quasi-Poisson regression instead of linear regression to
examine the impact of diﬀerent factors. The quasi-Poisson regression is a common ap-
proach to deal with overdispersion for count data and is based on a generalized linear
model framework [] with the so-called quasi-likelihood estimation. The quasi-Poisson
regression does not have an equivalent to the R found in ordinary least square regres-
sion. For the purpose ofmodel comparison, we calculate pseudo R, and the out-of-sample
pseudo R with bootstrapped conﬁdence intervals by using cross-validation and bootstrap
resampling as described above.
Solidarity. Table  shows regression results for explaining the variance in the volume
of use of the hashtag #bostonstrong. Interestingly, the most eﬀective predictor in the full
model and the best model seem to be inconsistent. The ‘visit’ predictor appears to be
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Table 6 Regression on #bostonstrong
Full Best
Tweets –0.086 (0.185) 0.007 (0.178)
Geo 0.077 (0.064) 0.219 (0.064)∗∗
Social 0.218 (0.169) 0.746 (0.142)∗∗∗
Visit 0.903 (0.208)∗∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.878 0.828
Os. R2 0.452 0.583
The standardized coefﬁcients, standard errors (in parentheses), adjusted R2 and out-of-sample R2 for the full model and the
best (geo-social) model.
Figure 7 Out-of-sample R2 for models of predicting #bostonstrong. (a) Overall, the geo-social model
performs signiﬁcantly better than all other models. (b) The predictor ‘visit’ adds more predictability than ‘geo’
in predicting the #bostongstrong occurrences in farther cities (top 50% in terms of geo-distance). Error bars
show the bootstrapped 95% conﬁdence intervals of the out-of-sample R2.
strong and signiﬁcant in the full model, but the geo-social model (without ‘visit’ predic-
tor) performs signiﬁcantly better than all othermodels (Figure (a)).We suspect that there
might be amoderator eﬀect that leads to such inconsistency. To test whether geographical
proximity could be the moderator, we split the cities into two equal-size groups based on
their geographic proximity to Boston. After decomposing the cities into the two groups,
the eﬀect of predictors become consistent in the full and best models in both sets, suggest-
ing the geographical proximity moderates the eﬀect of ‘visit’ in these models. The results
are shown in Figure (b). We see the predictors ‘geo’ and ‘social’ appear to be eﬀective in
predicting the use of #bostongstrong in cities in the ‘close’ group. This eﬀect disappears,
however, for the ‘far’ groups, where the ‘visit’ predictor takes the place of the ‘geo’ predic-
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Table 7 Regression on #prayforboston
Full Best
Tweets 0.955 (0.100)∗∗∗ 0.963 (0.099)∗∗∗
Geo –0.055 (0.054)
Social 0.048 (0.114) 0.046 (0.113)
Visit 0.387 (0.131)∗∗ 0.327 (0.117)∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.717 0.699
Os. R2 0.386 0.390
The standardized coefﬁcients, standard errors (in parentheses), adjusted R2 and out-of-sample R2 for the full model and the
best (social-visit) model.
Figure 8 Out-of-sample R2 for models of predicting #prayforboston.Models including the ‘visit’ or
‘social’ predictor perform slightly better than the baseline and geo models. However, the predictability of the
two predictors is not diﬀerentiable. Error bars show the bootstrapped 95% conﬁdence intervals of the
out-of-sample R2.
tor in the best model. Thus, for solidarity, geographic proximity moderates the eﬀect of
‘visit’ in the overall results, which explains the inconsistency in Table .
Sympathy. Table  shows the regression results for explaining the variance in the volume
of use of the hashtag #prayforboston. The predictor ‘visit’ seems to be a strong and signif-
icant predictor. The social-visit model performs the best but it is not signiﬁcantly better
than other models. As shown in Figure , models including the ‘visit’ or ‘social’ predictor
all perform similarly - slightly better than the baseline and geo models. The predictability
of the ‘visit’ and ‘social’ predictors is not diﬀerentiable, though the ‘visit’ predictor tends
to take over in a model including both predictors, as shown in Table .
Our analyses involve both US and non-US cities. To see whether the results are an ar-
tifact of the varying English speaking populations in diﬀerent countries, we restrict our
analysis to the US cities only. The results for US cities (as shown in Tables , , ) resem-
ble the overall patterns we discovered from all the  cities (Tables , , ).
4.3 Fear and social support
We further examine how fear itself is associated with expressions of social support.
We ﬁrst compute the correlations between shared fear and the two types of social sup-
port in terms of Spearman’s rank correlation coeﬃcients. As shown in Table , the level
of shared fear has higher correlation with #bostonstrong volume (r = ., p < .)
than with #prayforboston volume (r = ., p < .). Furthermore, the correlation be-
tween shared fear and #bostonstrong volume remains signiﬁcant (r = ., p = .)
when partialling out the four predictors (‘tweets’, ‘geo’, ‘social’ and ‘visit’), while the partial
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Table 8 Regression on fear (US only)
Full (Best)
Tweets 0.044 (0.036)
Geo 0.003 (0.024)
Social –0.045 (0.034)
Visit 0.094 (0.040)∗
Adj. R2 0.251
Os. R2 0.227
The standardized coefﬁcients, standard errors (in parentheses), adjusted R2 and out-of-sample R2 for the full model, which is
also the best model.
Table 9 Regression on #bostonstrong (US only)
Full Best
Tweets 0.209 (0.155) 0.339 (0.147)∗
Geo 0.121 (0.065)· 0.182 (0.060)∗∗
Social 0.185 (0.173) 0.377 (0.161)∗
Visit 0.462 (0.215)∗
Pseudo R2 0.887 0.866
Os. R2 0.542 0.655
The standardized coefﬁcients, standard errors (in parentheses), adjusted R2 and out-of-sample R2 for the full model and the
best (geo-social) model.
Table 10 Regression on #prayforboston (US only)
Full Best
Tweets 0.705 (0.057)∗∗∗ 0.706 (0.054)∗∗∗
Geo –0.001 (0.025)
Social 0.005 (0.066) 0.005 (0.065)
Visit 0.141 (0.079)· 0.140 (0.069)∗
Pseudo R2 0.974 0.974
Os. R2 0.657 0.668
The standardized coefﬁcients, standard errors (in parentheses), adjusted R2 and out-of-sample R2 for the full model and the
best (social-visit) model.
Table 11 Correlations between social support and fear
#bostonstrong #prayforboston
Fear 0.532∗∗∗ ; 0.253∗∗ 0.355∗∗∗ ; 0.135
#bostonstrong 0.488∗∗∗ ; 0.156
The rank correlations between fear, #bostonstrong and #prayforboston. The second value is the rank correlation partialling
out the four predictors (tweets, geo, social and visit).
correlation between shared fear and #prayforboston volume become negligible (r = .,
p = .).
We incorporate the level of shared fear into the quasi-Poisson regression models for ex-
plaining the #bostonstrong volume and #prayforboston volume, respectively. The results,
as shown in Table , indicate that ‘fear’ is indeed signiﬁcantly associated with #boston-
strong but not #prayforboston. Holding other predictors constant, cities that express fear
in line with Boston in response to the attacks tend to express more solidarity with Boston
in the aftermath. In contrast, cities that express fear in line with Boston are not necessarily
the cities that express the sympahty for Bostonians associated with #prayforboston.
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Table 12 Regression on social support with fear
Full (#bostonstrong) Full (#prayforboston)
Tweets –0.032 (0.198) 0.990 (0.114)∗∗∗
Geo 0.095 (0.064) –0.051 (0.054)
Social 0.281 (0.181) 0.050 (0.116)
Visit 0.600 (0.250)∗ 0.315 (0.166)·
Fear 0.343 (0.164)∗ 0.080 (0.113)
Pseudo R2 0.889 0.718
Os. R2 0.492 0.378
The standardized coefﬁcients, standard errors (in parentheses), pseudo R2 and out-of-sample R2 for the full models for
predicting #bostonstrong and #prayforboston. The ‘fear’ variable has signiﬁcantly positive association with #bostonstrong
but not #prayforboston.
5 Discussion
The goal of this study was to better understand the relationships that motivate the expres-
sion of fear and social support from geographically distant communities in response to
a terrorist attack on one particular city. Our primary ﬁnding is that while synchronous
expressions of fear are associated at once with shared geography, social network ties, and
direct personal experience between cities, direct personal experience represents the dom-
inant relationship.When this direct experience is controlled for, the relationships between
fear and geography and fear and more ‘virtual’ social contact via social media are elimi-
nated.
This ﬁnding has both practical and theoretical implications. For the practical purposes
of ﬁrst responders or government agencies seeking to reduce or quell fear in neighbor-
ing populations after a terrorist attack this ﬁnding suggests that fear will spread to those
communities with the most direct personal experience with the focal area.
Theoretically, it suggests that the ‘ripples’ of fear have a physical component, even over
large distances where there is not likely to be a direct, physical threat. While risk re-
searchers have emphasized the variety of social and symbolic channels that play a role
in the spread of responses to risk and threats, these ﬁndings suggest that many of these
social relations are nonetheless grounded in concrete, physical relations. In particular, de-
spite the importance of social media and other virtual connections between cities, the
social and/or personal contexts of shared fear correspond to shared physical interactions.
This eﬀect may have both geo-spatial and social components. Direct visits between com-
munitiesmay be amore eﬀectivemeasure of their eﬀective spatial proximity, capturing the
ease with which citizen can get from one place to another through accessible transporta-
tion. For example, people in Chicago may have expressed fear more in line with Boston
than people in Indianapolis (which is slightly closer to Boston) because, as a major airline
hub, Chicago may receive more traﬃc from Boston.
Personal visits may also reﬂect social proximity, where this social proximity has a physi-
cal element - if an individual had been toBoston recently theywere likely to have interacted
directly with friends or relatives for whom they feared after the attacks. Thus the extent
of ‘corporeal’ social exchange - the number of people that move back and forth between
the communities - may reﬂect a deeper set of social, cultural and economic ties that go
beyond sharing information and other forms of virtual communication to include senses
of shared community or identity. For example, comparing London andMontreal in terms
of sharing fear with Boston, the many additional virtual social relationships between Lon-
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don and Boston did not contribute to the fear that Londoners experienced since London
and Montreal are roughly equivalent in personal visits to Boston.
The analyses of social support shed further light on these explanations. Perhaps most
interesting is the relationship between the predictors of fear, the expression of fear, and
the expression of solidarity with Boston. Communities that expressed more fear also ex-
pressed more solidarity with Boston, and this variable, combined with personal visits, is
the best predictor of solidarity expression. This provides evidence, consistent with the
ﬁndings of [], that fear can be experienced through an attack on one’s group irrespective
of whether one feels personally in danger. Indeed, without fear as a predictor, solidarity
is best predicted by the geo-social model for ‘close’ cities, and US cities dominate the top
solidarity measurement, suggesting that for some communities, the attack on Boston was
a broader attack on a symbolic group - such as the US as a whole. [, ]. Including fear
as a predictor elicits the responses of those who are inclined to identify with Boston but
may not follow more typical mobility patterns.
Moreover, whether individuals consider their city to be in the same ‘group’ as Boston
may also be useful for interpreting the predictors of the sympathy expressed using #pray-
forboston. The #prayforboston hashtag was, like fear, best predicted by personal visits, but
its usage shows a weak correlation with fear itself. London, for example, was modest in its
expression of fear but very forthcoming in its use of #prayforboston, perhaps as the result
of that city itself having recently been the target of a terrorist attack. This suggests that, in
contrast to the strong relationship between fear and shared identity, sympathy is extended
outside of one’s own group.
From a practical perspective, these ﬁndings suggest that not all fear is necessarily bad.
Fear in surrounding communities may actually play a somewhat productive role in awak-
ening their solidarity with a community directly targeted by terrorism. This ﬁnding is
interesting for considering the general prospects of terrorism as a strategy for political
change in the era of social media. Whereas in past eras, terrorism may have encouraged
feelings of solidarity amongst distant others, there were few avenues through which these
distant others could demonstrate their solidarity to the targeted community and one an-
other.
6 Conclusion and future work
In this work, we study the expression of fear and social support in Twitter communication
during and after a terrorist attack. Using about million, nearly all geotagged, tweets we
examine the temporal correlation in these expressions between Boston and other cities.
Our ﬁndings have implications both for identifying vulnerable populations and encourag-
ing community resilience in response to terrorist attacks.
Our current work presents several limitations. First, we rely on a concept-based aﬀec-
tive lexicon that does not capture fear signals in non-English words or in more dynamic
forms (such as emoticons and acronyms). Future work will include human-coded con-
tent analysis to identify expressions not captured in ﬁxed dictionaries. Second, this paper
focused on the city-level aggregated statistics but did not include potentially important
social, political and economic attributes of these cities which will be included in future
analyses.
The connections we reveal between the dynamics of fear communications and human
mobility have important consequences for understanding the spread of information and
Lin and Margolin EPJ Data Science 2014, 3:31 Page 25 of 28
http://www.epjdatascience.com/content/3/1/31
emotions across populations. Further investigation of such connections, including the
characterization of the shared fears at multiple scales of time and space, may prove fruit-
ful in a number of areas including crisis management, information diﬀusion, and social
contagion.
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